A nice read. 

The article sheds some light on what happened.
However, upon reading it i grew confused than before… 
(as it introduced a few more concepts/constructs that i didn’t fully understand yet)
Also, based on the answer to “Q3” below,
a lot of the details could be superfluous. 
Here’s the relevant bit from the above article…
How Did the Loss Happen?
When an NRI deposits $1 million, the bank converts it into rupees—let’s say at ₹86 per USD, giving ₹8.6 crore. The bank can then lend or invest this amount. However, when the deposit matures, it must be returned in dollars. If the exchange rate changes significantly, the bank could suffer losses.
To manage this risk, the bank’s Asset-Liability Management (ALM) Desk shifts the liability to the Trading Desk through an internal derivative trade. The Trading Desk, in turn, hedges this externally using currency swaps with global banks to lock in exchange rates.
In theory, these hedges should cancel each other out. However, IndusInd Bank used different valuation methods:
- The external hedge was marked to market (MTM) - valued daily at fair market prices.
- The internal hedge followed swap cost accounting, causing a mismatch in valuations.
The problem arose when the bank repaid some foreign borrowings earlier than expected, forcing it to unwind the internal trades. This exposed the accounting gap, leading to a loss that had been incorrectly recorded as “intangible assets” instead of being provided for.
…and the Qs this raised in my mind upon reading it-
the bank’s Asset-Liability Management (ALM) Desk shifts the liability to the Trading Desk
Q1. Is the “trading desk” still considered a part of the bank or not?
(i.e. where does one draw the line to determine a loss/profit for the entity “IndusInd bank” )
The external hedge was marked to market (MTM)
The internal hedge followed swap cost accounting
Q2. Are these approaches the norms in respective domains?
- “MTM” on external open hedges out in the public market?
- “Swap-cost” on internal hedges carried out off-market?
The problem arose when the bank repaid some foreign borrowings earlier than expected, forcing it to unwind the internal trades
Q3. Why exactly did unwinding some internal trades/hedges sooner than expected result in “exposing accounting gap”? Couldn’t the external trades/hedges be unwound at the same time (or were they NOT callable, i.e. applicable ONLY at the originally agreed-upon time in future, not anytime during) ?
IMHO, here’s the potential key issue -
- if the deposits held by the bank were call-able
- as apparently the case was,
as the bank had to repay some deposits sooner than originally expected,
- and the external forex-hedges held by the bank were NOT call-able
- as apparently they did not call them when repaying the deposits (to nullify the loss)
…clearly they overlooked the risk (or underestimated the likelihood of this scenario).
i.e. did not match the assets with liabilities using approaches like -
- Requiring a larger penalty on the depositors for any pre-mature withdrawal
(necessary to offset this risk i.e. to ensure there would be no loss even in this scenario)
- or obtaining a call-able forex-hedge (presumably requiring higher premiums)
that was required to fully de-risk this situation.
Essentially, it looks like in this scenario, the bank
instead of being a smart “the house always wins due to the Vig” bookmaker,
was caught gambling with its own money! 
Apart from the obvious reason - greed,
maybe someone who understands banking better,
can chime-in if this is exactly what has happened (or something else as well),
and if there’s anything apart from greed to explain/justify such behavior.