# What does owning a foreign mine actually buy India? **URL:** https://tradingqna.com/t/what-does-owning-a-foreign-mine-actually-buy-india/198973 **Category:** The Daily Brief **Created:** [October 21, 2026, 12:08pm UTC](https://tradingqna.com/t/what-does-owning-a-foreign-mine-actually-buy-india/198973 "2026-10-21T12:08:05Z") **Posts on this page:** 1 **Page:** 1
### Author: ![Meher\_Smaran](https://tradingqna.com/user_avatar/tradingqna.com/meher_smaran/32/45882_2.png) [@Meher\_Smaran](https://tradingqna.com/u/Meher_Smaran) #### Post date: [October 21, 2026, 12:08pm UTC](https://tradingqna.com/t/what-does-owning-a-foreign-mine-actually-buy-india/198973/1 "2026-10-21T12:08:05Z")
[![](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!NZtV!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F593e326c-de0a-49bb-884a-11f79f278208_1536x1024.png)](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!NZtV!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F593e326c-de0a-49bb-884a-11f79f278208_1536x1024.png) Our goal with The Daily Brief is to simplify the biggest stories in the Indian markets and help you understand what they mean. We won’t just tell you what happened; we’ll tell you why and how too. We do this show in both formats: video and audio. This piece curates the stories that we talk about. You can listen to the podcast on [Spotify](https://open.spotify.com/show/2SJiLdv5LdxN2y2TKzJcdn), [Apple Podcasts](https://podcasts.apple.com/in/podcast/the-daily-brief/id1754694834), or wherever you get your podcasts and watch the videos on YouTube. You can also watch [The Daily Brief in Hindi](https://www.youtube.com/@marketsbyzerodhahindi). [![](https://img.youtube.com/vi/VV-XAuzZzxU/maxresdefault.jpg "Why owning a mine abroad isn’t enough | Why pharma rivals settle, not fight | The Daily Brief #574") ](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VV-XAuzZzxU) _Just a quick heads-up before we dive in. The Jio Platforms IPO opened today. We wrote about it then, and you can read the full story [here](https://thedailybrief.zerodha.com/p/a-dhan-dhana-dhan-ipo-for-jio)._ * * * In today’s edition of The Daily Brief: **1. What does owning a foreign mine actually buy India?** To secure critical industrial raw materials like coking coal, copper, and lithium, India has launched a ₹34,300-crore National Critical Mineral Mission targeting 50 overseas mines by 2031. However, recent disputes over Tata Chemicals’ soda ash mine in Kenya and operational bottlenecks in Mozambique show that owning foreign mines acts primarily as a price hedge and output claim rather than guaranteeing discounted minerals, while failing to overcome host-nation export bans or China’s overwhelming dominance in global mineral refining. **2. Why would rivals agree on when to compete?** Biocon recently settled a global patent dispute with Genentech over its breast cancer biosimilar, Pebrilzo, agreeing to delay its lucrative US market entry until late 2028. While US patent rules allow originator firms to protect drugs using secondary process and dosing patents, European markets open faster as patients shift to newer treatments. In contrast, Indian patent law places a higher burden of proof on originators, enabling domestic drugmakers to challenge secondary patents and launch affordable biosimilars sooner. * * * # **What does owning a foreign mine actually buy India?** In early September, Kenya’s President William Ruto[told Tata Chemicals to leave the country](https://apnews.com/article/2b278daab70247fbfe1e2e961231440a). He was talking about Magadi, a soda ash operation on the shores of a Kenyan lake that has run since 1911, and that[Tata Chemicals](https://zerodha.com/markets/stocks/NSE/TATACHEM/) has owned since 2005. Soda ash, in case you’re wondering, is a key ingredient in glass, detergents and a host of everyday products. [![](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!VYwZ!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F47b21a8f-3da3-4b49-af3d-a86025b7a6b0_1920x1080.png)](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!VYwZ!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F47b21a8f-3da3-4b49-af3d-a86025b7a6b0_1920x1080.png) [Source](https://www.tatachemicals.com/kenya/about) This was no small project. Magadi can[produce around 350,000 tonnes of soda ash a year](https://www.tatachemicals.com/media/newsroom/press-releases/tata-chemicals-magadi-confirms-full-compliance-submission-awaits-ministry-direction), sold to buyers across India, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Africa. Yet by the time Ruto spoke,[shipments had already been halted for weeks](https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/industry/manufacturing/tata-exit-order-risks-sh7-4bn-trade-tests-ruto-industrial-plan-5582816), while the government reviewed whether Tata was following local rules. Tata says it is fully compliant, and is[waiting for a government panel’s decision](https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/companies/tata-chemicals-awaits-kenya-panels-decision-on-magadi-soda-ash-mining-ban/article71554870.ece), with a High Court hearing due in November. But Ruto’s complaint wasn’t really about paperwork. It was about what Kenya gets out of the mine. He wanted to[bring in new investors to build a glass factory and a chemicals plant](https://www.outlookbusiness.com/corporate/tata-chemicals-says-fully-compliant-after-kenya-orders-it-to-exit-century-old-magadi-mine) in Kenya. We came across this story while trying to make sense of a bigger push. India, through both its government and its companies, is trying to secure minerals abroad, and owning foreign mines is a big part of that plan. Magadi made us ask a simple question: what does owning a mine actually get you? To answer that, it helps to start at the other end. A steel mill or a battery maker doesn’t want a mine for its own sake. It needs three things. It needs the right material, in a form its plant can actually use. It needs that material to arrive reliably, without anyone else being able to switch it off. And it needs a price it can plan around. That’s the story we wanted to pursue today. ## **Why is India looking abroad at all?** It isn’t because India lacks minerals underground. From what we can tell, it’s because what lies underground often isn’t what our factories need. Each mineral has its own story. Take coal. India has[over 400 billion tonnes of coal resources](https://coal.gov.in/sites/default/files/2026-02/chap2AnnualReport2026en.pdf). [![](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!UMzT!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F50a2e4e6-1cb1-42df-a760-7f319622ccc8_655x545.png)](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!UMzT!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F50a2e4e6-1cb1-42df-a760-7f319622ccc8_655x545.png) [Source](https://coal.gov.in/sites/default/files/2026-02/chap2AnnualReport2026en.pdf) Most of that, though, is the kind burnt in power plants. Steelmakers need[coking coal](https://thedailybrief.zerodha.com/p/a-new-ipo-lays-out-indias-coal-puzzle), which is heated without oxygen to make coke, the carbon-rich fuel that runs a blast furnace. And much of India’s coking coal carries too much ash. Washing can bring that ash down to[around 16–18%](https://www.niti.gov.in/sites/default/files/2024-11/Report_Enhancing%20Domestic%20Coking%20Coal%20Availability%20to%20Reduce%20the%20Import%20of%20Coking%20Coal_0.pdf), but a significant portion of the coal is lost in the process, and what’s left is still well short of the low-ash coal steelmakers prefer. So India[imported around 66 million tonnes of coking coal in FY26](https://coal.gov.in/major-statistics/production-and-supplies-0). [![](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!egFD!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fffbdd56b-347c-4b47-bb7d-f2c551ccd6c0_1178x309.png)](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!egFD!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fffbdd56b-347c-4b47-bb7d-f2c551ccd6c0_1178x309.png) [Source](https://coal.gov.in/major-statistics/production-and-supplies-0) [Copper has a different problem](https://thedailybrief.zerodha.com/i/167740926/the-new-vision-for-copper). India has[1.66 billion tonnes of copper ore resources](https://mines.gov.in/admin/download/686b732ce43f21751872300.pdf), but[only about 9.87% of these resources](https://mines.gov.in/admin/download/686b732ce43f21751872300.pdf) are classified as economically mineable. The rest is too poor in quality, or too costly to dig out. So India’s smelters[import about 85% of the copper concentrate they use](https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/metals/081326-indias-refined-copper-imports-set-to-shrink-concentrate-needs-persist-industry-panel). Concentrate is ore that has already been crushed and processed to raise its copper content, ready to be smelted into metal. Lithium is further behind still. India has[identified lithium deposits](https://www.sansad.in/getFile/loksabhaquestions/annex/182/AU267_CULiB1.pdf?source=pqals) in Jammu and Kashmir, but when the government put the block up for auction,[it drew no bids, and the auction was](https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/j-k/reasi-lithium-block-auction-annulled-due-to-non-receipt-of-bids-g-kishan-reddy)cancelled. That’s three minerals with three different gaps, but they end in the same place: the material Indian industry needs isn’t coming out of Indian ground in the form, or the volume, it needs. That’s the gap the government now wants to fill from abroad. In January 2025, it[approved the National Critical Mineral Mission](https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2097308), a ₹34,300-crore plan spread over seven years, which includes a target of securing 50 overseas mines by 2030–31. And since finding a mine worth owning is expensive and uncertain, in July 2026, it[introduced a scheme](https://nmet.gov.in/upload/press_release/Overseas_Guidelines.pdf) to share some of those costs. It offers up to ₹100 crore for early exploration, and up to ₹300 crore for drilling to find out how much mineral a deposit actually holds. ![](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cEbn!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F56490b37-2d2c-4b92-b9a2-0547c565e575_547x131.png) [Source](https://nmet.gov.in/upload/press_release/Overseas_Guidelines.pdf) The scheme’s fine print is revealing. Companies that take this money must agree to supply a share of whatever they find to Indian buyers, but[at prices comparable to international rates](https://nmet.gov.in/upload/press_release/Overseas_Guidelines.pdf). In other words, the government isn’t trying to get India cheaper minerals. It’s trying to get India access. That tells us a fair bit about what “security” means in official thinking. The rest of the state machinery is moving too. The Steel Ministry has[reportedly asked](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/indl-goods/svs/steel/steel-ministry-asks-sail-nmdc-to-scout-overseas-mineral-assets-for-raw-material-security/articleshow/134670196.cms)[SAIL](https://zerodha.com/markets/stocks/NSE/SAIL/) and[NMDC](https://zerodha.com/markets/stocks/NSE/NMDC/) to scout for mines abroad, both have[set up units in GIFT City](https://www.business-standard.com/markets/news/psus-tap-gift-city-for-overseas-mineral-hunt-amid-critical-supply-push-126101800834_1.html) to finance such deals. The Mines Ministry also has[placed officials in Indian embassies in 13 mineral-rich countries](https://www.business-standard.com/industry/news/govt-steps-up-support-for-miners-in-13-countries-amid-geopolitical-risks-126101800566_1.html) to help companies deal with local rules. India isn’t alone in this race. The[US has been spending heavily](https://thedailybrief.zerodha.com/p/the-us-might-change-the-rules-again) on its own supplies, including a $12 billion strategic minerals stockpile under President Trump, and[another $3 billion announced in August 2026](https://theprint.in/world/trump-administration-to-invest-3-billion-in-minerals-projects-to-boost-us-defense-supply-chains/3009063/) for mineral and battery projects One distinction is worth making before we go further. Not every Indian-owned mine abroad is about India’s supply.[Vedanta](https://zerodha.com/markets/stocks/NSE/VEDL/), for instance, is[investing nearly $600 million](https://www.business-standard.com/industry/news/vedanta-invests-600-million-to-double-south-african-zinc-capacity-126101800556_1.html) to double its South African zinc capacity to 500,000 tonnes a year. But zinc is a metal India largely produces at home, with Hindustan Zinc alone holding[about 77% of the domestic market](https://www.hzlindia.com/wp-content/uploads/Hindustan-Zinc-Factsheet-FINAL.pdf). That’s a sensible commercial bet, but it isn’t a supply-security play. ## **Why not just sign long-term contracts?** Before asking what owning a mine buys, it’s worth asking whether you need to own one at all. The simplest route to steady supply is to sign long-term agreements with several suppliers, across several countries. There’s no mine to buy and no foreign regulator to manage, and if one supplier falters, you lean on another. This works better than one might expect. Copper concentrate has been scarce worldwide since 2024, yet Hindalco says it[isn’t facing supply problems, because of its long-standing supplier relationships](https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/metals/081326-indias-refined-copper-imports-set-to-shrink-concentrate-needs-persist-industry-panel#:~:text=Kamle%20said%20India%20lacks%20sufficient%20domestic%20copper%20concentrate%20resources%20and%20remains%20import%20dependent%2C%20while%20noting%20Hindalco%20was%20not%20currently%20facing%20raw%2Dmaterial%20supply%20issues%20because%20of%20long%2Dstanding%20supplier%20relationships.). Relationships, it seems, are a form of security in their own right. But a contract has a hard limit. It’s a promise from a seller, and the seller’s government can override it. Countries have been[introducing export restrictions](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/19c60aa0-ee07-4a20-a138-33c967ac5008/GlobalCriticalMineralsOutlook2026.pdf) on cobalt, lithium, graphite, rare earths, bauxite, manganese and more. [![](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cwM7!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1b750c1d-b13e-4cff-8c7b-b94a9c7ff0c7_977x526.png)](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!cwM7!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1b750c1d-b13e-4cff-8c7b-b94a9c7ff0c7_977x526.png) [Source](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/19c60aa0-ee07-4a20-a138-33c967ac5008/GlobalCriticalMineralsOutlook2026.pdf) When that happens, a contract is only as good as the export licence behind it. And a contract does nothing for price, since you pay whatever the market charges. So contracts secure supply in normal times, and normal times aren’t when anyone worries about supply. That, presumably, is why companies and governments go a step further and buy into the mine itself. ## **So what does owning a mine actually get you?** Three Indian bets, each at a different stage, give us a reasonable picture. The earliest is KABIL (Khanij Bidesh India Ltd), a joint venture of three public-sector companies set up to secure minerals abroad. In January 2024, it[signed an agreement with Argentina’s Catamarca province](https://mines.gov.in/admin/storage/ckeditor/6_1751363904.pdf) to explore five areas for lithium. But what it holds is a licence to search, not a mine. By February 2026, it had only surveyed the surface, without drilling underground, and in August,[Parliament was told](https://sansad.in/getFile/annex/271/AU1710_CDQ1u3.pdf?source=pqars) that KABIL had spent just 10% of its $25 million five-year budget. Exploration is also a gamble. Coal India learnt this in Mozambique, where it[spent around $80 million exploring two coal blocks from 2009, only to find them commercially unviable and surrender them](https://www.miningweekly.com/article/no-response-from-mozambique-to-coal-indias-plea-for-new-block-2017-06-08). At this stage, ownership buys a lottery ticket and a long wait. Further along is Benga, a coking coal mine in Mozambique controlled by ICVL, a joint venture of Indian public-sector companies formed to secure coking coal. [The mine has](https://www.icvl.co.mz/index.php/en/organization/background-and-history) 236 million tonnes of mineable coal, which is washed down to 10–13.5% ash so that it suits Indian steelmakers like SAIL, NMDC and RINL. But every tonne travels 15 km by truck and around 590 km by train to port before it’s shipped, on a rail system that was[reported to handle only about six million tonnes a year](https://www.mining-technology.com/news/newsindias-icvl-plans-boost-production-benga-mine-mozambique-4633965/). Two things about Benga stood out to us. First, owning it didn’t keep it running. In 2015, when coking coal prices crashed to around $80 a tonne,[ICVL halted production because the mine had become financially unviable](https://www.miningweekly.com/article/indias-coal-ministry-prods-icvl-to-speed-up-coal-production-2017-02-20). A mine you own still answers to the market. Second, even its owners buy its coal through a contract. SAIL sought approval for a[long-term supply agreement with Benga’s operating company, alongside plans to more than double output to about 4.5 million tonnes a year](https://clubofmozambique.com/news/india-sail-plans-to-double-capacity-at-its-benga-coal-mines-in-mozambique-266206/). Even at that level, Benga would cover under 7% of India’s coking coal imports. The third bet is JSW Steel’s. In October 2025, it[completed a $60 million investment](https://www.mining-technology.com/news/jsw-stake-m-res-nsw), taking its stake in M Res NSW to[83.33%](https://bsmedia.business-standard.com/_media/bs/data/announcements/bse/17092025/0a01872a-4bb7-4177-a24b-9f7e3155b49c.pdf). Through a chain of holding companies, that works out to[about 30% of the business running coal mines](https://bsmedia.business-standard.com/_media/bs/data/announcements/bse/17092025/0a01872a-4bb7-4177-a24b-9f7e3155b49c.pdf) in Australia’s New South Wales. Alongside, JSW can[buy 30% of the coal produced](https://www.spglobal.com/commodity-insights/en/news-research/latest-news/metals/081224-indian-steelmaker-jsw-set-to-gain-access-to-australian-coking-coal-mines-through-acquisition), at prices linked to international markets. So owning a piece of the mine doesn’t get JSW cheaper coal. The deal gives JSW[both a right to buy coal for the life of the mine, and a share of the mine’s profits](https://www.dlapiper.com/news/2025/10/dla-piper-advises-jsw-steel-limited). That combination is another real case for ownership. When coking coal prices spike, JSW pays more for its coal, but its share of the mine’s earnings rises too, acting as a hedge in periods of high prices. But a hedge only protects what it covers. The two mines have[averaged about 6.5 million tonnes a year](https://www.outlookbusiness.com/corporate/jsw-steel-gets-board-nod-to-invest-120-million-in-australian-firm-m-res-nsw), so JSW’s 30% comes to roughly 2 million tonnes. One brokerage estimated that, at 35 million tonnes of steel capacity, JSW would need[around 28 million tonnes of coking coal a year](https://barodaetrade.com/Reports/JSWSteel-CompanyUpdate12Aug24-Research.pdf). That makes the Australian stake roughly 7% of the need. So here’s how we’d answer the question. Owning a mine can buy a claim on output, a financial hedge, and some control over quality. It doesn’t buy cheaper minerals, whether for JSW or under the government’s own scheme. It doesn’t override market prices, as Benga showed. And at the scale India has managed so far, it covers only a slice of what industry needs. There’s one more thing it doesn’t buy: the final say. ## **Who really decides what happens to a mine?** The country it sits in. And more and more, mineral-rich countries want something beyond royalties from mines that simply dig and ship. That’s what Magadi is really about. Tata already turns Magadi’s raw mineral into soda ash locally. Kenya wants the next step, the glass factory, and the jobs that come with it. Kenya is no outlier. Host countries pull different levers, and the gentlest is simply charging more. Australia supplies[most of India’s imported coking coal](https://www.spglobal.com/commodity-insights/en/news-research/latest-news/metals/081224-indian-steelmaker-jsw-set-to-gain-access-to-australian-coking-coal-mines-through-acquisition), and Queensland, its biggest coking coal state,[added new royalty tiers in 2022](https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2345413-queensland-coal-royalty-hike-brings-investment-warnings). New South Wales, where JSW’s mines are,[raised royalties on underground mines from 7.2% to 9.8% in July 2024](https://www.miningweekly.com/article/nsw-hikes-coal-royalties-2023-09-07). Even stable, investor-friendly democracies rewrite the terms when prices run high. The harder lever is banning raw exports to force processing at home. Indonesia[banned exports of raw nickel ore in January 2020](https://www.esdm.go.id/en/media-center/arsip-berita/bijih-nikel-tidak-boleh-diekspor-lagi-per-januari-2020). Zimbabwe, after restricting raw lithium ore,[suspended exports of lithium concentrate in February 2026](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/19c60aa0-ee07-4a20-a138-33c967ac5008/GlobalCriticalMineralsOutlook2026.pdf), and it wants companies to turn that concentrate into chemicals like lithium sulphate before exporting. A[full ban on concentrate exports](https://www.miningweekly.com/article/sinomine-secures-additional-zimbabwe-lithium-export-quota-2026-08-25) begins in January 2027. Mozambique has brought in similar rules for graphite. What we found most interesting is who ends up doing that processing. When countries force it onshore, someone has to build the plants. In Indonesia, Chinese companies[control about three-quarters of nickel refining capacity](https://www.mining.com/web/chinese-firms-control-around-75-of-indonesian-nickel-capacity-report-finds/). In Zimbabwe, Chinese firms dominate lithium mining, and the country’s only lithium sulphate plant belongs to China’s Huayou, which[can’t yet take concentrate from other producers](https://www.miningweekly.com/article/zimbabwes-sole-lithium-salt-plant-unable-to-process-third-party-metal-official-says-2026-07-17). Even then, lithium sulphate is only an intermediate. It still has to be[refined into lithium hydroxide or carbonate](https://www.marketscreener.com/news/huayou-to-start-zimbabwe-lithium-sulphate-production-early-2026-ce7d5adcd18aff25) before it goes into a battery. So, as far as we can tell, pushing processing onshore hasn’t loosened China’s grip. It has often just moved the first stage of China’s supply chain closer to the mine. That brings us to the last link in the chain. ## **Even if the minerals arrive, can India use them?** Most minerals are of little use to a factory until they’ve been refined into metals or chemicals. And this is where concentration is most extreme.[China has a huge advantage here](https://thedailybrief.zerodha.com/p/critical-minerals-china-dominance-india-mobile-internet-fibre-broadband). It[handles around 71% of global lithium refining](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/19c60aa0-ee07-4a20-a138-33c967ac5008/GlobalCriticalMineralsOutlook2026.pdf), over 75% of cobalt refining, 91% of rare earth processing for magnets and 94% of graphite production for batteries. What’s more striking is the direction of travel. Mining is spreading to more countries, which gives India more places to buy from, but refining isn’t. In 2020, the top refining country for each major mineral handled an average of 68% of global output. By 2025, that was around 70%. Breaking that pattern is expensive. The[IEA estimates](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/19c60aa0-ee07-4a20-a138-33c967ac5008/GlobalCriticalMineralsOutlook2026.pdf) that building refining plants outside the countries that already dominate can cost anywhere from 20% to over 150% more. [![](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Nf-R!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F163f13bb-88f9-4745-b12b-01f778f147a9_977x586.png)](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Nf-R!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F163f13bb-88f9-4745-b12b-01f778f147a9_977x586.png) [Source](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/19c60aa0-ee07-4a20-a138-33c967ac5008/GlobalCriticalMineralsOutlook2026.pdf) [Running them is also around 50% more expensive](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/19c60aa0-ee07-4a20-a138-33c967ac5008/GlobalCriticalMineralsOutlook2026.pdf) on average, partly because the equipment, technology and skilled workers are concentrated where the industry already exists. [![](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!FexT!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F08e518c7-50b7-4a1c-a711-06b0e353d32e_977x586.png)](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!FexT!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F08e518c7-50b7-4a1c-a711-06b0e353d32e_977x586.png) [Source](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/19c60aa0-ee07-4a20-a138-33c967ac5008/GlobalCriticalMineralsOutlook2026.pdf) India already refines some minerals at scale, copper among them. But its capacity to make[specialised chemicals for batteries](https://thedailybrief.zerodha.com/p/india-plugs-into-chinas-batteries) remains limited, and building it would take serious money. ## **Where is the weakest link?** Seen this way, whether India should own mines abroad seems to depend on the mineral. For coking coal, the gap is ore quality, so overseas mines make sense, as long as we’re clear that they hedge a slice of demand rather than secure all of it. For copper, India has the smelters but not the ore. For lithium, graphite and rare earths, the binding constraint is the refinery, and a mine alone doesn’t loosen it. That leaves one question we couldn’t answer. Countries like Kenya and Zimbabwe want processing done on their soil. India needs processing capacity it doesn’t have. So far, Chinese companies have been the ones offering to build those plants. Can Indian companies make the same offer? [![](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!o-28!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4953780b-b999-4dfb-b0f0-f13395c6c17a_1456x304.webp)](https://zerodha.com/open-account/?c=ZAPVVI) * * * # **Why would rivals agree on when to compete?** Last week,[Biocon](https://zerodha.com/markets/stocks/NSE/BIOCON/) did something that sounds odd for a company that has just built a cheaper cancer drug. It agreed to wait. On October 14, Biocon[settled](https://biospectrumindia.com/news/95/28646/biocon-secures-earliest-licensed-launch-dates-for-pebrilzo-bpertuzumab-following-global-patent-settlement-with-genentech.html) a global patent fight with Genentech, the US arm of Swiss drugmaker Roche. The fight was over Perjeta, a drug for breast cancer. In this type of cancer, a protein called HER2 keeps telling cells to multiply, and Perjeta works by blocking that signal. Biocon has made its own version, called Pebrilzo. It’s a _biosimilar_, a near-copy of a complex biological medicine. We’ve[explained these before](https://thedailybrief.zerodha.com/p/keytruda-the-clone-wars). Under the deal, Biocon can sell Pebrilzo in Europe and the UK from the first quarter of 2027. In America, it must wait until the third quarter of 2028. Other markets open up somewhere between 2026 and 2028. All of this still depends on regulators approving the drug. These dates matter, because Perjeta is not a cheap drug. In India, a single vial has a[listed price](https://www.truemeds.in/medicine/perjeta-420-mg-injection-14-ml-tm-inon2-006431) of around ₹2.5 lakh, and a patient may need many doses. [![](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!CL3f!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe804cd6e-a70a-42b7-ba5c-3a14b7d796d4_234x336.png)](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!CL3f!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe804cd6e-a70a-42b7-ba5c-3a14b7d796d4_234x336.png) [Source](https://www.roche.com/) What makes the deal puzzling is that Perjeta’s main US patent[already ran out in 2025](https://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/organon-and-henlius-poherdy-first-biosimilar-roches-perjeta-approved-fda). Roche itself[expected cheaper copies](https://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/organon-and-henlius-poherdy-first-biosimilar-roches-perjeta-approved-fda) to show up in 2026. So why would Biocon, with a drug ready to go, sign up to wait until late 2028? The short answer is that a patent settlement isn’t really a peace treaty. It’s a calendar. This story is a mini class on how that calendar gets drawn. ## **One patent expired. Twenty-eight others didn’t.** A drug is rarely protected by a single patent. The main one covers the molecule itself. Others cover how it’s formulated, how it’s dosed, what it’s used for and, especially for biological drugs, how it’s made. These expire at different times. So when the headline patent lapses, a rival can still trip over all the others. Genentech knew exactly which of those patents to use, because American law had already given it a look at Biocon’s recipe. Under the US system, a company seeking approval for a biosimilar can go through a process nicknamed the[_patent dance_](https://www.fr.com/insights/thought-leadership/blogs/genentech-files-first-pertuzumab-bpcia-suit/). It hands its application, including details of how it makes the drug, to the original drugmaker. The two sides then exchange lists of patents they want to fight over. Biocon and Genentech went through this dance, and[agreed on their list](https://www.goodwinlaw.com/en/insights/blogs/2026/08/genentech-files-bpcia-patent-infringement-suit-against-biocon-over-proposed-perjeta-biosimilar) on July 1. By the end of that month, Genentech had[sued Biocon over 28 patents](https://www.pearceip.law/2026/07/26/roche-sues-biocon-on-28-us-pertuzumab-patents/), covering the drug, its uses and various ways of manufacturing it. Now weigh what Biocon stood to lose. The[Biosimilars Forum](https://www.clinicalleader.com/doc/biosimilars-forum-scientific-publication-identifies-pathway-development-for-biosimilars-0001), an industry group, estimates that a biosimilar costs $100 million to $300 million to develop. That’s roughly ₹960 crore to ₹2,900 crore, though this is an industry figure, not Biocon’s own cost. A courtroom loss could have shut that investment out of the world’s most lucrative drug market for years. Roche had something to lose too. If a court struck down an important patent, the door wouldn’t just open for Biocon. It would open for every other copycat in the queue. So each side swapped a gamble for a date. Biocon got the certainty that it can sell, and Roche got time. Biocon isn’t the only one with a date, either. China’s Henlius, whose copy Poherdy became the[first Perjeta biosimilar](https://www.goodwinlaw.com/en/insights/blogs/2026/02/genentechhoffmann-la-roche-and-shanghai-henlius-biotechorganon-settle-pertuzumab-bpcia-case) approved in the US last November, also settled with Genentech in January. Perjeta’s competition in America, in other words, is being scheduled rather than fought out. ## **Why Europe opens first** So we know why the two sides settled on when cheaper copies would enter the US. But why do they get into Europe sooner, almost 18 months sooner? That’s an interesting story too. Start with where Perjeta makes its money. In 2025, the drug[earned Roche](https://www.roche.com/media/releases/med-cor-2026-01-29) about CHF 3 billion. The US alone brought in about 43% of that. Europe brought in just about 18%, and its sales fell 13% from the year before. So Europe is a shrinking market, for a reason Roche spells out in its own results. It is[moving patients](https://www.roche.com/media/releases/med-cor-2026-01-29) from Perjeta to a newer drug called Phesgo. Phesgo combines Perjeta’s active ingredient with another antibody in one quick injection under the skin. Perjeta, by contrast, is given through a long IV drip. Many European patients have already made that switch from the drip to the injection. In Europe, Phesgo now[makes more money](https://www.roche.com/media/releases/med-cor-2026-01-29) than Perjeta. In America, that isn’t the case yet. [![](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!mJ51!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4ddc02b9-f92a-49ff-949f-2b44848be7a8_710x629.png)](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!mJ51!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4ddc02b9-f92a-49ff-949f-2b44848be7a8_710x629.png) [Source](https://www.roche.com/media/releases/med-cor-2026-01-29?) That may help explain why Biocon gets into Europe much sooner. There, it will be selling a copy of a drug that is already shrinking for Roche. In America, the IV Perjeta business is still large, and every extra year gives Roche more time to move those patients over too. We can’t know whether this shaped the negotiations. But the dates line up neatly with Roche’s own sales map. We’ve seen this shape before. Humira, a drug for arthritis and Crohn’s disease, was for years the world’s best-selling medicine. Its[main US patent ran out in 2016](https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/20-2402/20-2402-2022-08-01.html), but its maker AbbVie held many more. In 2017, AbbVie[settled](https://news.abbvie.com/2017-09-28-AbbVie-Announces-Global-Resolution-of-HUMIRA-R-adalimumab-Patent-Disputes-with-Amgen) with Amgen, which had built a cheaper copy. Amgen could launch in Europe in 2018, but in America only in 2023. Europe first, America last, because America is where drug prices, and therefore profits, are highest. Some large buyers of Humira sued. They argued these deals were _pay-for-delay_, where a drugmaker[pays a rival](https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/topics/competition-enforcement/pay-delay) to stay out of a market, which can break competition law. The worry is simple: patients miss out on cheaper drugs, while the original drugmaker effectively pays rivals to stay away. [![](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!eLxd!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8450d4e4-3db9-4029-b113-172bb6c37fa0_868x334.png)](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!eLxd!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F8450d4e4-3db9-4029-b113-172bb6c37fa0_868x334.png) [Source](https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/topics/competition-enforcement/pay-delay) In 2022, a US appeals court[ruled against them](https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/20-2402/20-2402-2022-08-01.html). It said that holding a lot of patents isn’t illegal by itself, and that letting a rival into Europe early wasn’t a hidden payment for keeping it out of America, since patent rights differ from country to country. That ruling is the backdrop for deals like Biocon’s. Agreeing on a future launch date isn’t illegal on its own, and nothing public suggests anything more than that here. But a deal can be good for both companies without being the best outcome for patients. Had Biocon fought and won, cheaper Perjeta might have reached Americans sooner. Had it lost, perhaps much later. There’s no way to know. What’s certain is that the fastest route is now closed until late 2028, at least for Biocon. ## **At home, the rules flip** In India, the same fight is playing out very differently.[Zydus](https://zerodha.com/markets/stocks/NSE/ZYDUSLIFE/) didn’t wait for a deal. It[launched](https://www.pearceip.law/2024/10/16/delhi-high-court-reinstates-injunction-against-zydus-pertuzumab-biosimilar/) its own Perjeta copy in 2024, and Roche[took it to court](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/103228643/). One of Roche’s Indian patents doesn’t cover the medicine itself. It covers a _method_ of making it. And that creates a problem for Roche. To prove Zydus copied its method, Roche first needs to know how Zydus makes its drug. But that’s Zydus’s secret. Indian law does offer a way around this. A court can order a company to reveal its manufacturing process, but only if the patent holder first shows that the two products are _identical_. In July 2025, Roche tried exactly this. Its argument was that Zydus had used Perjeta as the benchmark for its own drug. The Delhi High Court[wasn’t convinced](https://www.pearceip.law/2025/07/25/high-court-of-delhi-declines-to-order-zydus-to-disclose-pertuzumab-biosim-manufacturing-process/). That only proved the two drugs were similar. Similar isn’t identical. So Zydus didn’t have to reveal anything. [![](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!dC1l!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5915f007-c31a-4887-a0d0-1ed1ce697749_962x437.png)](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!dC1l!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5915f007-c31a-4887-a0d0-1ed1ce697749_962x437.png) [Source](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/50402589/) In America, it’s the other way round. Through the patent dance, Roche got to see Biocon’s manufacturing details before it even went to court. That made it much easier to build a case, which put Biocon in a weaker spot. So in America, Biocon settled for a date. In India, Zydus launched and fought. We’ve[written before](https://thedailybrief.zerodha.com/p/indian-pharma-wants-to-conquer-cancer) about Indian pharma’s push into complex cancer drugs. This is the less glamorous side of that story. Building the drug is now only the first test. For Biocon, the question in 2028 won’t be whether it can sell its drug in America. It’ll be how many patients are still on the drug it copied. And for patients, there’s still the bigger question. Did this deal bring a cheaper drug closer, or push it further away? * * * - This edition of the newsletter was written by Vignesh & Mridula. * * * _**[In our latest Subtext episode](https://subtextbyzerodha.substack.com/p/kunal-mangal-on-the-true-cost-of)**, former development economist and AI engineer Kunal Mangal breaks down the true cost of India’s government job exams. We discuss why aspirants take multiple attempts at the UPSC, how they assess risk, and what this reveals about unemployment and state capacity._ _Watch the episode on **[YouTube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uNUKo0e6PJY)**._ * * * # Tidbits **1. Festive Car Sales Leave Dealers With Leaner Inventories** Festive buying is helping car dealers clear their stock faster. In September, the gap between cars shipped to dealerships and those registered by customers narrowed 45% compared with a year ago. For dealers, that means less money tied up in unsold cars and lower costs of holding them. It also takes some pressure off them to offer steep discounts to make room for fresh stock. **Source:** [Business Standard](https://www.business-standard.com/industry/auto/car-inventory-levels-lower-this-festival-season-amid-rising-demand-126101800626_1.html) **2. Trade Margins on 137 Cancer Drugs Capped From November 9** From November 9, a 30% cap on trade margins will apply to 137 non-scheduled anti-cancer medicines. The NPPA’s move limits the markup allowed as these medicines move through the supply chain to patients. Along with customs duty waivers on key ingredients, the measures are expected to reduce prices of some medicines by up to 70%. The actual savings will depend on which drug a patient needs. **Source:** [Mint](https://www.livemint.com/news/india/cancer-drugs-to-get-cheaper-in-india-from-november-9-full-list-of-137-medicines-and-how-much-you-could-actually-save-11792385350720.html) **3. Accenture may sell its China business for up to $1.5 billion** Accenture is exploring a sale of its Greater China operations for as much as $1.5 billion after receiving unsolicited interest over the past year. It has hired JPMorgan for a strategic review, with private equity and strategic buyers expected to show interest. Accenture could also retain a significant minority stake after the sale. **Source:** [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/accenture-looks-sell-chinese-operations-up-15-billion-ft-reports-2026-10-18/) **4. Everyday Goods Could Get Costlier After Diwali** FMCG companies are facing a familiar problem: the ingredients and packaging that go into their products are getting more expensive. Palm oil prices are up 21% year-on-year and sugar prices 18%, squeezing the margins companies earn on their sales. Brands are now considering price hikes after Diwali to recover some of those costs. For shoppers, that could mean a higher bill for everyday purchases once the festive season is over. **Source:** [Mint](https://www.livemint.com/industry/retail/fmcg-companies-face-margin-squeeze-in-h2-as-input-costs-rise-price-hikes-likely-after-diwali-11792320486859.html) **5. Sugar Stocks Slide as Government Restricts Ethanol Diversion** Sugar stocks fell after the government set zero diversion of sugar syrup and B-heavy molasses for ethanol in the 2026/27 tender. These are materials mills can use to produce ethanol, so the decision changes how they had planned to divide production between sugar and fuel. The government is prioritising domestic sugar availability and keeping prices in check, while mills will have to rework their plans around the restriction **Source:** [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-sets-zero-sugar-diversion-ethanol-202627-tender-2026-10-16/) ## **Want more tidbits? Catch up on last week’s recap!** [![Weekly Tidbits #9](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!CTWz!,w_140,h_140,c_fill,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep,g_auto/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F47a113b0-a0eb-4340-a0fe-915b79a8652f_1536x1024.png)](https://thedailybrief.zerodha.com/p/weekly-tidbits-9) #### [Weekly Tidbits #9](https://thedailybrief.zerodha.com/p/weekly-tidbits-9) [Zerodha](https://substack.com/profile/250820523-zerodha) · 17 Oct [Read full story](https://thedailybrief.zerodha.com/p/weekly-tidbits-9) * * * # **Beyond Today’s Brief** There’s always more happening at Markets by Zerodha. - **[The Chatter](https://thechatter.zerodha.com/p/the-chatter-sebi-rbi-dipam-jio-wipro):** What are regulators and leaders at Jio Financial Services and Wipro signalling for the upcoming quarters? How is SEBI expanding the Account Aggregator framework, while Jio Financial scales its lending book to ₹37,320 crore and Wipro navigates seasonal headwinds? - **[Points & Figures](https://pointsandfigures.substack.com/p/why-are-fewer-indians-flying):** Why are fewer Indians flying? From a 6.5% drop in domestic air passengers to a 170% surge in jet fuel prices and severe disruptions on West Asia routes, what do airline cuts and empty seats reveal about the true cost of air travel? - **[Aftermarket Report](https://aftermarketreport.zerodha.com/p/it-rally-powers-nifty-to-a-strong):** How did Nifty fall 260 points off its opening level to drop 1.11% and close back below 22,900? And what do heavy selling in private banks, crude oil hovering near $100 per barrel, and the Fear & Greed Index plunging back into extreme fear at 18 signal as market breadth deteriorated sharply? * * * Join us on **WhatsApp** , where we share interesting soundbites from concalls, articles, and everything else we come across throughout the day. You’ll also get notified the moment a new video or article drops so that you can read or watch it right away. [Join us](https://www.whatsapp.com/channel/0029VbBp3sDDOQIV8rw4Fi12) Thank you for reading. Do share this with your friends and make them as smart as you are 😉 > **[What does owning a foreign mine actually buy India?](https://thedailybrief.zerodha.com/p/foreign-mines-critical-minerals-india-biocon-roche-chepear-cancer-drug)** > > Plus: Why would rivals agree on when to compete?