US sanctions on Russia make things tough for India



Our goal with The Daily Brief is to simplify the biggest stories in the Indian markets and help you understand what they mean. We won’t just tell you what happened, but why and how too. We do this show in both formats: video and audio. This piece curates the stories that we talk about.

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In today’s edition of The Daily Brief:

  • US vs Russia but India has to suffer
  • Is Argentina making a comeback?

US vs Russia but India has to suffer

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, it set off one of the biggest geopolitical shifts in recent history. The world—led by the U.S. and the EU—quickly realized that directly confronting a nuclear-armed superpower could have devastating consequences. Instead, the response came in the form of economic warfare, with sanctions becoming the main tool.

Sanctions are essentially penalties imposed by countries or groups to limit a target nation’s ability to function economically or politically. The idea is straightforward: if open combat isn’t an option, especially with a nuclear power like Russia, you target the resources that fund its actions—its economy.



In Russia’s case, the West targeted its oil and gas sector, a critical pillar of its economy, accounting for roughly 15-20% of its GDP and a major source of funding for its war effort.



The first wave of sanctions imposed in 2022 was sweeping. Europe, once Russia’s largest energy customer, decided to drastically cut its dependence on Russian oil and gas.



At the start of the war, Europe accounted for over 50% of Russia’s energy exports. By the end of 2022, European purchases of Russian oil had plummeted.





This left Moscow scrambling to find new buyers, and it didn’t take long for India and China to step in. Russia, desperate to keep its oil flowing, offered steep discounts—a lifeline for both nations, which were grappling with surging global oil prices.

The G7 also implemented a price cap of $60 per barrel on Russian crude. The enforcement mechanism was innovative: any tanker carrying Russian crude priced above this limit couldn’t be insured or financed by Western companies. Since Western firms dominate 90% of the marine insurance market, shipping Russian oil above the cap became riskier and more expensive.

To bypass these restrictions, Russia turned to a shadow fleet of older, poorly regulated tankers, some over 20 years old and often uninsured. This fleet became a key player in transporting discounted Russian oil to India and China, enabling Moscow to maintain its export volumes despite Western sanctions. However, the discounts came at a cost: Russia’s revenues from oil exports shrank as it sold crude at $20-30 below Brent crude prices.

India and China quickly became Russia’s biggest oil customers.



Source: Energy and Clean Air

Before 2022, Russian crude made up virtually none of India’s imports. By 2024, it accounted for 40-45%, helping India manage its $180-200 billion annual energy bill. Meanwhile, China, the world’s largest energy consumer, was purchasing nearly 47% of Russia’s total crude exports. The steep discounts made Russian oil not just attractive but essential for both nations.



Source: Energy and Clean Air



Source: ITLN

Fast forward to 2025, and the U.S. has now imposed its toughest sanctions yet. These measures target two major Russian oil companies and 183 vessels out of more than 600 from Russia’s shadow fleet, tightening the loopholes that allowed Russian oil to flow freely to India and China. With fewer tankers available and higher risks involved in shipping, transporting Russian oil has become significantly more challenging.

The U.S. aims to erode Russia’s oil revenues further, which have already been under pressure. Fossil fuel export earnings dropped by 5% year-on-year in 2024.



Source: Energy and Clean Air

While crude oil revenues rose by 6% due to higher global prices, export volumes dropped by 2%. The new sanctions are expected to cut Russia’s oil revenues by another 20-25%, adding to its economic troubles.

For India and China, these sanctions are already creating challenges. Indian refiners, who had been relying heavily on discounted Russian crude, are now being forced to turn to Middle Eastern suppliers. Yogesh Patil, an energy expert, explained in an interview with the Economic Times that Indian oil companies will face difficulties since they can’t pass on the higher crude costs to consumers due to frozen domestic fuel prices.

In China, refiners are also shifting to other sources, such as Africa and the Middle East. This growing demand for alternative crude is pushing up spot prices, adding more pressure to global oil markets. Brent crude has already risen above $81 per barrel, reflecting the impact of these disruptions.



The sanctions are reshaping global oil flows yet again. For Russia, losing access to its shadow fleet could jeopardize its ability to maintain export volumes. For countries like India and China, higher crude prices mean inflationary pressures, rising transportation costs, and potential fiscal challenges. The West, meanwhile, is betting that these new measures will force Moscow to confront the economic costs of its war-driven policies.

As the sanctions continue to bite, the stakes remain high for everyone involved. Will Russia find a way to adapt, or will the U.S. strategy finally achieve its goal of choking off Moscow’s war machine? The next few months will be critical in determining the outcome of this economic warfare.


Is Argentina making a comeback?

There’s a famous saying often attributed to Nobel Prize-winning economist Simon Kuznets: “The four types of economies in the world are: developed, underdeveloped, Japan, and Argentina.” While Japan deserves its own story another day, today, we shine the spotlight on Argentina—a country once among the wealthiest globally, now grappling with a new experiment in radical governance under President Javier Milei.

To understand why Milei’s policies are making waves far beyond Argentina’s borders, we first need to unpack the paradox of this nation. Argentina went from incredible wealth in the early 20th century to becoming a cautionary tale of economic mismanagement, caught in a repeating cycle of growth followed by crisis for over a century.

The Paradox of Argentina: A Century of Decline

In the early 1900s, Argentina was thriving. Its fertile plains and booming agriculture made it a top exporter of beef, wheat, and other commodities. Its cities were modernizing, foreign investment was pouring in, and trade made up a staggering 80% of its GDP. Back then, Argentina rivaled countries like France and Germany in wealth, and its capital, Buenos Aires, earned the moniker “Paris of South America.”

But everything changed with the 1929 Great Depression. Global demand for agricultural exports collapsed, and Argentina, overly reliant on foreign trade, was caught completely unprepared. The sudden economic contraction exposed deep vulnerabilities. Trade as a share of GDP plummeted, never fully recovering.

Then came political instability: a series of military coups, populist governments, and ideological flip-flops. Each regime brought a fresh wave of nationalizations, privatizations, and re-nationalizations, frustrating and scaring off foreign investors. I am not kidding when we say they were frustrated; once Argentina had 5 presidents in a matter of 11 days, that’s how bad things were.

To appease a struggling population, successive governments turned to massive spending on subsidies, welfare, and bloated public sector jobs. But these populist measures came at a cost. Inflation soared as the government printed money to fund its programs. There are stories of shopkeepers changing the prices of their products daily to keep up with their inflating currency.

The Argentine peso devalued repeatedly, losing public trust.



Source: Voronoiapp

Over time, unofficial currency markets flourished, offering a more realistic exchange rate than the government’s controlled rate. This dual exchange system reflected a deep mistrust in the state’s ability to manage its finances.

Even the international markets had lost faith in Argentina. After all, you really don’t keep high expectations from a country that has defaulted 9 times in its history on its debt and currently has the highest debt owed to the IMF by more than double that of the second most indebted country.



Source: Reuters

Too Many Factors, Too Many Failures

If anyone claims to know the exact reason for Argentina’s decline, they’re probably oversimplifying or not being honest. A mix of internal mismanagement, external shocks, and deep-rooted structural problems has shaped Argentina’s journey. What we’ve shared here is just the surface of a much more complex story. The real picture involves countless interconnected factors.

By the time Javier Milei stepped onto the stage, Argentina’s economy was in shambles. Inflation had soared into triple digits, half the population was living below the poverty line, and the country was drowning in debt, including billions owed to international creditors like the IMF.

Enter Javier Milei: A Radical Prescription

In late 2023, Javier Milei won the presidency by defying conventional wisdom. He had one of the most depressing political campaigns. His campaign wasn’t about promising hope or prosperity—it was a bitter pill of reality. He declared that Argentina couldn’t afford to kick the can down the road any longer. His proposals were stark: cut subsidies, shrink the bloated public sector, deregulate industries, and potentially dollarize the economy.

Why would people vote for such a grim vision? Perhaps because they were fed up. Decades of traditional policies had failed, and someone “crazy” enough to rip everything apart and start anew felt like a gamble worth taking. Milei branded his approach as necessary shock therapy, an economic and political restart.

A Year In: What’s Changed?

One year is too short a time to judge economic policies but excuse us for our stupidity, we still want to give a very brief overview of what’s changed since December 2023.

Since taking office, Milei has slashed government spending by 30%. More than 30,000 public sector workers have been laid off, energy and transport subsidies have been eliminated, and public works projects have been suspended. Pensions and state wages have been frozen.

The immediate effect? Inflation has dropped dramatically. In December 2024, prices rose by just 2.7% month-on-month, compared to 25.5% in December 2023. Argentina’s primary budget (excluding interest payments) is now in surplus for the first time in over a decade.



Source: Economist

However, the reality on the ground is less rosy:

  • Poverty: Over 53% of Argentines now live below the poverty line, up from 42% just a year ago.
  • Consumer Spending: Down by 20% as purchasing power shrinks.
  • Construction Activity: Plummeted by 29% year-on-year.



Source: Economist

While inflation has eased, essential goods—particularly those dependent on now-removed subsidies—have seen staggering price hikes. Transport and energy costs have surged by over 300% and 400%, respectively.

The Naomi Klein Perspective

Naomi Klein, in her book The Shock Doctrine , argues that times of crisis often serve as opportunities to push through radical reforms without public consent. She cites examples like Chile under Pinochet, post-invasion Iraq, and the Asian Financial Crisis to show how such reforms often exacerbate inequality. Critics of Milei’s policies echo this concern, warning that his reforms could widen the gap between Argentina’s wealthy elite and its struggling majority.

Is the Experiment Working?

Evaluating Milei’s presidency depends on one’s economic perspective. Free-market enthusiasts hail his radical approach as a bold experiment in deregulation and fiscal discipline. They see the potential for Argentina to break free from its cycle of debt and inflation. On the other hand, proponents of state intervention criticize the human cost of his austerity measures, pointing to rising poverty and social unrest.

Milei’s economic gamble remains precarious. While the numbers show progress in inflation and fiscal discipline, the structural issues—weak industries, labor market rigidity, and reliance on commodities—persist. Moreover, public tolerance for “short-term pain” has its limits, and without tangible improvements in living standards, patience could wear thin.

The Road Ahead

Argentina’s story is one of resilience, tragedy, and paradox. From the heights of prosperity to the depths of economic despair, its history offers lessons for the world. Whether Javier Milei’s radical reforms can rewrite the country’s narrative remains uncertain. For now, Argentina watches, waits, and hopes that this gamble will pay off.

As spectators, we leave it to you to decide whether this bold experiment is the bitter medicine Argentina needed—or just another chapter in its long story of economic mismanagement.


Tidbits

  1. Hyundai and Kia are facing rising emissions in India due to their SUV-heavy lineups and slow progress in adopting electric vehicles (EVs). While they have plans to produce EVs locally, challenges like affordability and limited charging infrastructure may make it harder for them to meet India’s green goals.
  2. Tata Electronics has become a major player in Apple’s supply chain, now producing 26% of India’s iPhone output in 2024. The company’s revenue hit ₹40,000 crore, thanks to a 180% surge in production.
  3. Vedanta Ltd. is planning to split into five separate businesses to tackle its parent company’s debt and aim for higher market valuations.
  4. India’s trade deficit widened to $21.94 billion in December, up from $18.76 billion a year ago, highlighting growing pressure on the country’s external trade balance.

-This edition of the newsletter was written by Krishna and Kashish


Subscribe to Aftermarket Report, a newsletter where we do a quick daily wrap-up of what happened in the markets—both in India and globally.


Thank you for reading. Do share this with your friends and make them as smart as you are :wink: Join the discussion on today’s edition here.

Observation - A

Observation - B

It is not quite clear how B follows A,
with the added sanctions and risks,
wouldn’t the supplier (Russia) be forced to further discount their oil-supply
to ensure that the extremely limited number of buyers continue to buy from them? :thinking:

Has this not happened? If so, why?

Is there anything to indicate that the suppliers cannot further reduce the price to account for any of the additional risks perceived by the buyers?
(For example - Is the supplier already selling the product at cost, or with such minimal margin, that they would rather stop selling than reduce prices further?)

Reading the article, it is not apparent why these sanctions will have any impact on the supply/outflow as none of the sanctioned entities appear to registered in the US jurisdiction, nor is there any mention of them having significant assets/income in the US jurisdiction. IIRC, there was an article in the past that highlighted how such entities, in light of the previous US sanctions, have switched to doing business previously in USD to now either in the Indian INR or in the Chinese Yuan.

Also, as mentioned in the linked announcement,
these announced sanctions prohibiting the provision of U.S. petroleum services to persons located in the Russian Federation, are in effect after 27 FEB 2025 (6 weeks from now).
Nothing changes right now on that front, it’s business as usual.

Also,

Hmmm… seems like the other way around, no?
Supply was constrained (or wasn’t increased to match demand),
hence the prices increased.
Right?

In the context of the actual impact of the sanctions (which is not much),
this sounds like a classic negotiation tactic in a “buyer’s market” -
“Dear seller, sweeten the deal or we will walk away”.


PS: The more diligently i read these Daily-Brief posts, the more “plot-holes” are becoming evident. A lot of the assertions are pure conjectures involving a leap of faith. If an LLM is involved anywhere in the pipeline of creating these posts, can the prompt be updated with - “Strictly avoid any speculation, stick to the facts and only suggest impact that is clearly evident”.

PPS: Alternately, these articles could benefit a lot from an additional editorial pass asking the following questions of every sentence in the article -

  • Is it really though?
    • Remove/rewrite the sentence
      as long as the answer is - “Maybe not, but it is definitely possible.”.
  • OK, so what?
    • Remove/rewrite the sentence
      as long as the answer is - “Actually, nothing much, but…”.

If nothing else, after such an editorial pass,
i expect the resulting articles will be a lot more concise,
and hopefully that way more folks end-up reading the relevant matter/references.

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Regarding the article on Argentina -

Few more details that seem relevant -

According to the most recently concluded [IMF Executive Board Discussusion on the Ex-Post Evaluation of Argentina’s Exceptional Access Under the 2022 Extended Fund Facility [Press Release] [Report] that was held on 10-Jan-2025, the board concluded that -

in 2022-23, Argentina faced large and concentrated repurchase obligations to the Fund totaling about US$ 35 billion

image

The following questions come to mind -

Q1. What were the exact conditions that led to the “large and concentrated repurchase obligations” that Argentina faced in 2022-23 ?

Q2. Article V, Section 7 and Article VIII of Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund mention various potential repurchase obligations. Many of these can be unilaterally applied/triggered by a super-majority-vote in the IMF. Were any opportunistic economic manipulation by the prevalent major economic superpowers responsible for triggering the “large and concentrated repurchase obligations” on Argentina in 2022-23 ?

Q3. Of the ~44 Bln USD loan sanctioned by the IMF,
how much of it is actually been disbursed and is accumulating interest on it,
and at what rate? (to be paid by Argentina)
Note: for the history of various disbursements and repurchases,
please refer to Argentina’s Transactions with the IMF (from May 01, 1984 to December 31, 2024) .

Q4. In 2024,

  • Argentina has managed to maintain a average budget surplus of more than 1Bln USD;
    that too when their currency has experienced a 350% inflation over the same period.
    Source: Economist (the source posted in the article above).

  • In Oct 2024, the IMF updated their policy resulting in a major reduction of surcharge on certain loans.
    This reduces the financial burden on Argentina by an estimated 450 Mln USD each year.

Assuming the current-rate, and discounting any potential benefits that Argentina may achieve due to a potential strengthening of its currency in future, how long would it take Argentina to repay all its outstanding obligations with the IMF?

IMHO, the answer to the last question above,
would give one a better sense of how much “in debt” is Argentina
and whether they are recovering or not.
(compared to the billions of USD and pesos being discussed without the entire context.)

Thank you so much for your detailed questions. Based on my limited understanding of the subject—and acknowledging that I could be wrong—here’s what I think:

Q1 . What were the exact conditions that led to the “large and concentrated repurchase obligations” that Argentina faced in 2022-23 ?

It would be both presumptuous and unwise of me to pinpoint the exact conditions, but I can, with somewhat confidence, highlight a few contributing factors:
a) Failure of the 2018 IMF Stand-By Arrangement (SBA): The program failed to stabilize the economy due to a combination of poor implementation, worsening macroeconomic conditions (think COVID 19), and insufficient structural reforms.
b) Optimistic Debt Maturity Schedule: The 2018 program required Argentina to start repaying large amounts in 2022-23, leading to a concentrated set of obligations totaling $35 billion in those two years. This created a repayment crunch, as Argentina had to pay back the funds within a short timeframe.
c) Lack of Policy Adjustments: The 2018 program was criticized for being too optimistic about Argentina’s ability to implement reforms and restore economic stability.

Q2 . Article V, Section 7 and Article VIII of Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund mention various potential repurchase obligations. Many of these can be unilaterally applied/triggered by a super-majority-vote in the IMF. Were any opportunistic economic manipulation by the prevalent major economic superpowers responsible for triggering the “large and concentrated repurchase obligations” on Argentina in 2022-23 ?

It is hard to speculate this and it appears that the obligations arose as part of the original repayment schedule. Typically, loans are repaid over 3¼ to 5 years from the date of each disbursement. Since the bulk of the funds were disbursed early in the 2018 SBA (front-loaded disbursements), repayment obligations were naturally concentrated around 2022-23.

Q3 . Of the ~44 Bln USD loan sanctioned by the IMF,
how much of it is actually been disbursed and is accumulating interest on it,
and at what rate? (to be paid by Argentina)

I haven’t been able to find precise calculations or reliable data on this. However, I will keep this thread open and update it if I come across any relevant information.

Q4. In 2024,

  • Argentina has managed to maintain a average budget surplus of more than 1Bln USD;
    that too when their currency has experienced a 350% inflation over the same period.
  • In Oct 2024, the IMF updated their policy resulting in a major reduction of surcharge on certain loans.
    This reduces the financial burden on Argentina by an estimated 450 Mln USD each year.

Assuming the current-rate, and discounting any potential benefits that Argentina may achieve due to a potential strengthening of its currency in future, how long would it take Argentina to repay all its outstanding obligations with the IMF?

This isn’t a straightforward question to answer. It’s not just a matter of numbers but also a complex issue of political economy, with many unknown factors at play.

For instance:

  • The continuation of President Milei’s radical reforms is uncertain.
  • The stance of international institutions towards Argentina as a debtor could shift.
  • Future currency strength and broader macroeconomic stability are unpredictable.

Making assumptions like ceteris paribus (all else being equal) feels overly simplistic. That said, I will keep an eye out for expert analyses and share any updates or projections that could help clarify this.

I hope I did some justice to your questions :slight_smile:

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